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Less than 30 minutes. Upload documents directly, connect via OAuth for Slack, or use our REST API for bulk processing.

How does outcome tracking work?

Outcomes are detected automatically from follow-up documents, Slack messages, and web intelligence. You confirm with one click. Each reported outcome makes your future analyses more accurate.

How is Decision Intel different from ChatGPT or a general AI assistant?

ChatGPT gives one opinion from one model: ungoverned, untraceable, unaudited. Decision Intel is the reasoning audit platform. Most tools audit your data; we audit your reasoning — and catch the fatal blind spots in strategic memos before the committee does. It measures the noise in your reasoning the same way Kahneman did in the insurance underwriter study, simulates an AI boardroom of CEO, CFO, and board personas, runs what-if interventions against a 143-case public reference library, and compounds every confirmed outcome back into a calibrated Decision Quality Index your audit committee can defend. Not a chatbot; a reasoning audit, checkable from memo to outcome.

Live demo: Decision Intel on Blockbuster (2000)

Top-line result

F29/100

Decision Quality Index · Critical

Anchored to $800M annual late-fee revenue as a strength rather than a liability. Dismissed online as "niche" in 2000 despite broadband doubling every 18 months. The $50M offer was 0.05% of enterprise value — asymmetrically cheap insurance rejected on reflex.

Status Quo BiasAnchoring BiasLoss Aversion

Uploaded Document

The excerpt the platform analyzed

“After evaluating the Netflix proposal, we have concluded that online DVD rental represents a very small niche segment of the market. Our core customers value the in-store browsing experience and immediate availability. Late fee revenue of approximately $800 million annually remains essential to our business model, and we see no reason to disrupt a proven revenue stream for an unproven digital concept.”

Source:Blockbuster Board Meeting Minutes, CEO John Antioco's assessment after meeting with Netflix co-founders Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph·2000-04-15

Platform-detected signals

4 red flags in the document

Each flag below was detectable from the document text alone. No outcome data. No hindsight.

01

Over 90% of revenue derived from physical store operations with no diversification strategy for digital channels

Critical · Detectable at decision time

02

Wholesale dismissal of digital disruption as a "niche market" without rigorous scenario analysis of internet adoption trends

Critical · Detectable at decision time

03

Late-fee dependency ($800M/year) was generating significant customer resentment and creating vulnerability to any competitor offering a no-late-fee alternative

Critical · Detectable at decision time

04

No online strategy or digital distribution roadmap despite broadband adoption accelerating across the United States

Critical · Detectable at decision time

Cognitive biases detected

5 biases across the document

★ Anchoring BiasStatus Quo BiasOverconfidence BiasConfirmation BiasLoss Aversion

CEO / Board Question Simulator

Questions the steering committee would ask

Predicted from the document's own signals. In the live product, these are generated from your memo — no two runs produce the same list.

“Is there a chance we're underestimating anchoring bias risk on this decision — and what would change our mind if so?”

“Walk me through over 90% of revenue derived from physical store operations with no diversification strategy for digital channels — what's our defensible answer if the board raises it?”

“What would it cost us to do acquire Netflix in 2000 for $50M (or at a stepped-up $150–250M in 2002); use 9,000 stores as returns/exchange endpoints for an integrated online-offline mode… before we commit?”

“If this memo were re-run in six months with the outcome revealed, what do we think would embarrass us most?”

Counterfactual

What a bias-adjusted process would have done

Recommendation

Acquire Netflix in 2000 for $50M (or at a stepped-up $150–250M in 2002); use 9,000 stores as returns/exchange endpoints for an integrated online-offline model; eliminate late fees in 2002 rather than 2005; invest in streaming infrastructure in 2005 once broadband penetration crosses 50%.

Why it would have worked

The Blockbuster-Netflix decision is the clearest "incumbent cannibalization paralysis" case in modern business. Late fees (16% of revenue) made customer-friendly disruption organizationally unthinkable, even as the data that customers hated late fees was overwhelming.

Estimated alternative outcome

Blockbuster becomes the platform that Netflix would have built — same streaming dominance, but with 9,000-store physical distribution making content acquisition economics 20–30% better. Could plausibly have held $30B+ market cap through 2015.

Evidence Timeline

What was visible, and when

Every event below was documentable before the outcome was known. The platform looks for signals like these in live memos.

1997-08
Netflix founded; launches DVD-by-mail rental service.
Netflix S-1 Registration Statement, 2002
2000-04
Netflix co-founders Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph offer Netflix to Blockbuster for $50M. Blockbuster CEO John Antioco declines.
Marc Randolph, "That Will Never Work" (2019)
2004-08
Blockbuster finally launches Blockbuster Online (DVD-by-mail) — four years after rejecting Netflix. By this point Netflix has 2M+ subscribers.
Blockbuster 2004 annual report
2005
Activist investor Carl Icahn wins three board seats; pressures Antioco to cut investment in online and no-late-fees initiatives.
Blockbuster proxy filings, 2005
2007-03
Antioco ousted; replaced by Jim Keyes who reverses the digital-forward strategy.
Blockbuster 8-K, March 20 2007
2007-01
Netflix launches streaming — the technology Blockbuster said was "unproven".
Netflix Q1 2007 shareholder letter
2010-09-23
Blockbuster files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Netflix market cap: $13B.
SDNY Case No. 10-14997

Who Was in the Room

Stakeholders and positions

Who advocated, who dissented, who was overruled, and who stayed silent — the most reliable single signal of decision-process quality.

John Antioco

Advocate

CEO (1997–2007)

Rejected 2000 Netflix acquisition. Later (2004–2006) reversed and led the $400M push into online and no-late-fees — but was ousted by Icahn before it matured.

Ed Stead

Advocate

General Counsel & EVP Business Development

Primary voice dismissing the Netflix offer; argued Blockbuster should build rather than buy.

Carl Icahn

Advocate

Activist shareholder (from 2005)

Fought against online and no-late-fee investment; later called his Blockbuster investment his "worst decision."

Jim Keyes

Advocate

CEO (2007–2011)

Reversed Antioco's digital pivot; refocused on store operations.

Reed Hastings

Dissenter

Netflix CEO (external counterparty)

Explicitly flagged the disruption during the 2000 meeting; his prediction became a 10-year recording of prescience.

Cross-Case Pattern

Other decisions with the same pattern

Your memo, not Blockbuster's

Audit your own strategic memo in under 60 seconds.

Same bias framework, same pre-decision-evidence discipline. Drop in your strategic memo or board deck, get the DQI grade, flagged biases, predicted CEO questions, and counterfactual back before your next meeting.

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The excerpt the platform analyzed

“After evaluating the Netflix proposal, we have concluded that online DVD rental represents a very small niche segment of the market. Our core customers value the in-store browsing experience and immediate availability. Late fee revenue of approximately $800 million annually remains essential to our business model, and we see no reason to disrupt a proven revenue stream for an unproven digital concept.”

Source:Blockbuster Board Meeting Minutes, CEO John Antioco's assessment after meeting with Netflix co-founders Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph·2000-04-15

4 red flags in the document

Each flag below was detectable from the document text alone. No outcome data. No hindsight.

01

Over 90% of revenue derived from physical store operations with no diversification strategy for digital channels

Critical · Detectable at decision time

02

Wholesale dismissal of digital disruption as a "niche market" without rigorous scenario analysis of internet adoption trends

Critical · Detectable at decision time

03

Late-fee dependency ($800M/year) was generating significant customer resentment and creating vulnerability to any competitor offering a no-late-fee alternative

Critical · Detectable at decision time

04

No online strategy or digital distribution roadmap despite broadband adoption accelerating across the United States

Critical · Detectable at decision time

Questions the steering committee would ask

Predicted from the document's own signals. In the live product, these are generated from your memo — no two runs produce the same list.

“Is there a chance we're underestimating anchoring bias risk on this decision — and what would change our mind if so?”

“Walk me through over 90% of revenue derived from physical store operations with no diversification strategy for digital channels — what's our defensible answer if the board raises it?”

“If this memo were re-run in six months with the outcome revealed, what do we think would embarrass us most?”

What a bias-adjusted process would have done

Recommendation

Why it would have worked

Estimated alternative outcome

What was visible, and when

Every event below was documentable before the outcome was known. The platform looks for signals like these in live memos.

1997-08

Netflix founded; launches DVD-by-mail rental service.

Netflix S-1 Registration Statement, 2002

2000-04

Netflix co-founders Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph offer Netflix to Blockbuster for $50M. Blockbuster CEO John Antioco declines.

Marc Randolph, "That Will Never Work" (2019)

2004-08

Blockbuster finally launches Blockbuster Online (DVD-by-mail) — four years after rejecting Netflix. By this point Netflix has 2M+ subscribers.

Blockbuster 2004 annual report

2005

Activist investor Carl Icahn wins three board seats; pressures Antioco to cut investment in online and no-late-fees initiatives.

Blockbuster proxy filings, 2005

2007-03

Antioco ousted; replaced by Jim Keyes who reverses the digital-forward strategy.

Blockbuster 8-K, March 20 2007

2007-01

Netflix launches streaming — the technology Blockbuster said was "unproven".

Netflix Q1 2007 shareholder letter

2010-09-23

Blockbuster files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Netflix market cap: $13B.

SDNY Case No. 10-14997

Stakeholders and positions

Who advocated, who dissented, who was overruled, and who stayed silent — the most reliable single signal of decision-process quality.

John Antioco

Advocate

CEO (1997–2007)

Rejected 2000 Netflix acquisition. Later (2004–2006) reversed and led the $400M push into online and no-late-fees — but was ousted by Icahn before it matured.

Ed Stead

Advocate

General Counsel & EVP Business Development

Primary voice dismissing the Netflix offer; argued Blockbuster should build rather than buy.

Carl Icahn

Advocate

Activist shareholder (from 2005)

Fought against online and no-late-fee investment; later called his Blockbuster investment his "worst decision."

Jim Keyes

Advocate

CEO (2007–2011)

Reversed Antioco's digital pivot; refocused on store operations.

Reed Hastings

Dissenter

Netflix CEO (external counterparty)

Explicitly flagged the disruption during the 2000 meeting; his prediction became a 10-year recording of prescience.