How is sensitive data protected?

All documents are encrypted with AES-256-GCM at rest and TLS 1.2+ in transit. A GDPR anonymization layer removes PII before any AI processing. Hosted on Vercel + Supabase (both SOC 2 Type II); Decision Intel’s own product-level audit is targeted for Q4 2026.

How long does integration take?

Less than 30 minutes. Upload documents directly, connect via OAuth for Slack, or use our REST API for bulk processing.

How does outcome tracking work?

Outcomes are detected automatically from follow-up documents, Slack messages, and web intelligence. You confirm with one click. Each reported outcome makes your future analyses more accurate.

How is Decision Intel different from ChatGPT or a general AI assistant?

ChatGPT gives one opinion from one model: ungoverned, untraceable, unaudited. Decision Intel is the reasoning audit platform. Most tools audit your data; we audit your reasoning — and catch the fatal blind spots in strategic memos before the committee does. It measures the noise in your reasoning the same way Kahneman did in the insurance underwriter study, simulates an AI boardroom of CEO, CFO, and board personas, runs what-if interventions against a 143-case public reference library, and compounds every confirmed outcome back into a calibrated Decision Quality Index your audit committee can defend. Not a chatbot; a reasoning audit, checkable from memo to outcome.

Live demo: Decision Intel on Lehman Brothers (2008)

Top-line result

F22/100

Decision Quality Index · Critical

Near-unanimous board, dissenting CRO sidelined rather than escalated, leverage framed against peers rather than absolute risk tolerance, and explicit dismissal of Bear Stearns as an applicable signal — all hallmarks of an F-grade decision process.

Overconfidence BiasGroupthinkAnchoring Bias

Uploaded Document

The excerpt the platform analyzed

“The risk committee recommended maintaining current MBS and commercial real estate exposure levels, noting that housing market fundamentals remain sound despite regional softness. Leverage ratios of 31:1 are consistent with peer institutions.”

Source:Lehman Brothers Risk Committee Presentation, March 2007·2007-03

Platform-detected signals

5 red flags in the document

Each flag below was detectable from the document text alone. No outcome data. No hindsight.

01

Leverage ratio at 31:1 (highest on Wall Street)

Critical · Detectable at decision time

02

$85B in MBS with no hedging strategy

Critical · Detectable at decision time

03

Chief Risk Officer subsequently sidelined/demoted

Critical · Detectable at decision time

04

Repo 105 accounting to temporarily hide $50B in assets

Critical · Detectable at decision time

05

Commercial real estate doubled in 12 months

Critical · Detectable at decision time

Cognitive biases detected

3 biases across the document

★ GroupthinkOverconfidence BiasConfirmation Bias

CEO / Board Question Simulator

Questions the steering committee would ask

Predicted from the document's own signals. In the live product, these are generated from your memo — no two runs produce the same list.

“Is there a chance we're underestimating groupthink risk on this decision — and what would change our mind if so?”

“Walk me through leverage ratio at 31:1 (highest on Wall Street) — what's our defensible answer if the board raises it?”

“What would it cost us to do cut gross leverage from 31:1 toward 15:1 by Q4 2007 via asset sales and equity raise; hedge MBS concentration via CDX indices; reinstate CRO authority over e… before we commit?”

“If this memo were re-run in six months with the outcome revealed, what do we think would embarrass us most?”

Counterfactual

What a bias-adjusted process would have done

Recommendation

Cut gross leverage from 31:1 toward 15:1 by Q4 2007 via asset sales and equity raise; hedge MBS concentration via CDX indices; reinstate CRO authority over exposure limits; halt Archstone acquisition closing.

Why it would have worked

Lehman had three distinct windows (March 2007 peer concerns, August 2007 Bear hedge-fund collapse, March 2008 Bear bailout) where a less-biased process would have forced deleveraging. The decision to keep expanding through all three is what made failure catastrophic rather than merely painful.

Estimated alternative outcome

Survival as a significantly smaller firm — likely acquired or recapitalized in 2008 rather than liquidated, preserving ~$600B of counterparty value and avoiding the global credit freeze that Lehman's uncontrolled failure triggered.

Evidence Timeline

What was visible, and when

Every event below was documentable before the outcome was known. The platform looks for signals like these in live memos.

2006-Q4
Lehman becomes the #1 underwriter of U.S. MBS, aggressively expanding commercial real estate via Archstone acquisition commitments.
FCIC Report, Chapter 9
2007-03
Risk Committee memo recommends maintaining MBS exposure; cites "peer leverage" as benchmark.
Valukas Report, Vol. 1
2007-Q2
CRO Madelyn Antoncic raises concerns about leverage; is sidelined from risk decisions.
Valukas Report, Vol. 3 (Antoncic testimony)
2007-12
Repo 105 transactions escalate — $38.6B in assets temporarily removed from balance sheet at quarter-end.
Valukas Report, Vol. 3
2008-03-16
Bear Stearns collapse; Fuld tells staff Lehman is "not Bear Stearns." No material deleveraging follows.
FCIC Report, Chapter 17
2008-06
Lehman reports first quarterly loss ($2.8B); still pays $128M in dividends that quarter.
Lehman Brothers Q2 2008 10-Q
2008-09-10
Lehman preannounces $3.9B Q3 loss and $5.3B writedown; stock falls 45% in one day.
Lehman Brothers September 10, 2008 press release
2008-09-15
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. files Chapter 11 — largest bankruptcy in U.S. history ($691B in assets).
SDNY Case No. 08-13555

Who Was in the Room

Stakeholders and positions

Who advocated, who dissented, who was overruled, and who stayed silent — the most reliable single signal of decision-process quality.

Richard S. Fuld Jr.

Advocate

Chairman & CEO

Dominated board discussion; publicly rejected multiple buyout approaches (Korea Development Bank, Warren Buffett in 2008).

Joseph Gregory

Advocate

President & COO

Pushed aggressive expansion into commercial real estate. Fired by Fuld in June 2008 after Q2 loss.

Madelyn Antoncic

Overruled

Chief Risk Officer (to 2007)

Raised concerns about leverage and CRE exposure through 2006–2007; moved out of risk role in late 2007.

Erin Callan

Advocate

CFO (Dec 2007 – June 2008)

Publicly defended balance sheet through Q1/Q2 2008. Departed shortly before collapse.

Henry "Hank" Kaufman

Silent

Board Director (Finance & Risk Committee chair)

Economist with deep market expertise; committee met twice in 2006 and twice in 2007 despite the exposure buildup.

Cross-Case Pattern

Other decisions with the same pattern

Your memo, not Lehman Brothers's

Audit your own strategic memo in under 60 seconds.

Same bias framework, same pre-decision-evidence discipline. Drop in your strategic memo or board deck, get the DQI grade, flagged biases, predicted CEO questions, and counterfactual back before your next meeting.

Start free audit See more demos

The excerpt the platform analyzed

“The risk committee recommended maintaining current MBS and commercial real estate exposure levels, noting that housing market fundamentals remain sound despite regional softness. Leverage ratios of 31:1 are consistent with peer institutions.”

Source:Lehman Brothers Risk Committee Presentation, March 2007·2007-03

5 red flags in the document

Each flag below was detectable from the document text alone. No outcome data. No hindsight.

01

Leverage ratio at 31:1 (highest on Wall Street)

Critical · Detectable at decision time

02

$85B in MBS with no hedging strategy

Critical · Detectable at decision time

03

Chief Risk Officer subsequently sidelined/demoted

Critical · Detectable at decision time

04

Repo 105 accounting to temporarily hide $50B in assets

Critical · Detectable at decision time

05

Commercial real estate doubled in 12 months

Critical · Detectable at decision time

Questions the steering committee would ask

Predicted from the document's own signals. In the live product, these are generated from your memo — no two runs produce the same list.

“Is there a chance we're underestimating groupthink risk on this decision — and what would change our mind if so?”

“Walk me through leverage ratio at 31:1 (highest on Wall Street) — what's our defensible answer if the board raises it?”

“If this memo were re-run in six months with the outcome revealed, what do we think would embarrass us most?”

What a bias-adjusted process would have done

Recommendation

Why it would have worked

Estimated alternative outcome

What was visible, and when

Every event below was documentable before the outcome was known. The platform looks for signals like these in live memos.

2006-Q4

Lehman becomes the #1 underwriter of U.S. MBS, aggressively expanding commercial real estate via Archstone acquisition commitments.

FCIC Report, Chapter 9

2007-03

Risk Committee memo recommends maintaining MBS exposure; cites "peer leverage" as benchmark.

Valukas Report, Vol. 1

2007-Q2

CRO Madelyn Antoncic raises concerns about leverage; is sidelined from risk decisions.

Valukas Report, Vol. 3 (Antoncic testimony)

2007-12

Repo 105 transactions escalate — $38.6B in assets temporarily removed from balance sheet at quarter-end.

Valukas Report, Vol. 3

2008-03-16

Bear Stearns collapse; Fuld tells staff Lehman is "not Bear Stearns." No material deleveraging follows.

FCIC Report, Chapter 17

2008-06

Lehman reports first quarterly loss ($2.8B); still pays $128M in dividends that quarter.

Lehman Brothers Q2 2008 10-Q

2008-09-10

Lehman preannounces $3.9B Q3 loss and $5.3B writedown; stock falls 45% in one day.

Lehman Brothers September 10, 2008 press release

2008-09-15

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. files Chapter 11 — largest bankruptcy in U.S. history ($691B in assets).

SDNY Case No. 08-13555

Stakeholders and positions

Who advocated, who dissented, who was overruled, and who stayed silent — the most reliable single signal of decision-process quality.

Richard S. Fuld Jr.

Advocate

Chairman & CEO

Dominated board discussion; publicly rejected multiple buyout approaches (Korea Development Bank, Warren Buffett in 2008).

Joseph Gregory

Advocate

President & COO

Pushed aggressive expansion into commercial real estate. Fired by Fuld in June 2008 after Q2 loss.

Madelyn Antoncic

Overruled

Chief Risk Officer (to 2007)

Raised concerns about leverage and CRE exposure through 2006–2007; moved out of risk role in late 2007.

Erin Callan

Advocate

CFO (Dec 2007 – June 2008)

Publicly defended balance sheet through Q1/Q2 2008. Departed shortly before collapse.

Henry "Hank" Kaufman

Silent

Board Director (Finance & Risk Committee chair)

Economist with deep market expertise; committee met twice in 2006 and twice in 2007 despite the exposure buildup.