American International Group
AIG Credit Default Swap Crisis
Estimated impact: $182B
AIG's Financial Products division sold approximately $500 billion in credit default swaps on mortgage-backed CDOs without adequate reserves. When housing prices collapsed, AIG faced margin calls it could not meet, requiring a $182 billion federal bailout to prevent cascading counterparty failures.
Decision context
Whether to continue underwriting credit default swaps on mortgage-backed securities without posting collateral or building loss reserves against a potential housing downturn.
What the record already said
The document below predates the decision. Everything after it is read from that document alone, so a reader can check each line against the words above it rather than take the reading on trust.
2005 Financial Products division strategy memo on CDS portfolio expansion targeting $500B notional value
Source: AIG Financial Products Division (Joseph Cassano)
What a reader could have found without knowing the ending
- CDS portfolio concentration in mortgage-backed securities
- Risk models assuming housing prices could not decline nationally
- No stress testing for correlated defaults
- Leverage ratios exceeding 100:1 on some positions
Decision intelligence would have flagged the extreme concentration risk and the foundational assumption that national housing prices could not decline simultaneously — an assumption contradicted by historical data from Japan (1990s) and regional US markets. The absence of correlated-default stress testing would have triggered immediate model risk warnings.
Written after the outcome was known. Nothing here can be falsified, which is why it sits below the document rather than above it.
Decision anatomy
Red = risk factor present · Green = protective factor present
Biases present in the decision
★ Primary driver · Severity estimated from bias type and decision outcome
Toxic combinations
The curated library this case sits in
Across all 155 curated case studies in our library, by documented outcome:
The library is curated toward documented failures, so this split describes the library, not the base rate of deals. The case above is one row in it.
Lessons learned
- Selling insurance without reserves against tail risk is a business model that guarantees eventual catastrophe.
- Anchoring to AAA credit ratings on structured products masked the true default correlation risk.
- Counterparty risk concentration can transform a single firm's failure into a systemic crisis.
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report (2011); Congressional Oversight Panel, "The AIG Rescue" (2010) (SEC Filing)
These patterns were flaggable in American International Group's own record — before the outcome.
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Workflows that fire on decisions like American International Group’s
The same Recognition-Rigor Framework that documents this case audits memos in the same shape — before the outcome forces the lesson.