Boeing
Boeing 737 MAX MCAS Design Failures
Estimated impact: $20B
Boeing's 737 MAX aircraft crashed twice in five months, killing 346 people. The MCAS flight control system, designed to compensate for engine placement changes, relied on a single angle-of-attack sensor and was not disclosed to pilots. Boeing prioritized schedule and cost over safety, committing sunk cost fallacy by building on the aging 737 platform rather than designing a new aircraft.
Decision context
Whether to design a new narrowbody aircraft or retrofit the 50-year-old 737 airframe with larger engines, adding software patches to compensate for aerodynamic compromises.
Biases present in the decision
Toxic combinations
- Sunk Ship
- Yes Committee
- Golden Child
- Deadline Panic
Reference class base rates
Across all 146 curated case studies in our library:
Lessons learned
- Sunk cost fallacy in the 737 platform investment led Boeing to patch an aging design rather than invest in a purpose-built replacement.
- Overconfidence in software solutions to compensate for hardware compromises introduced single points of failure.
- Authority bias within the FAA's delegated inspection program allowed Boeing to self-certify safety-critical systems.
Source: U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, "Final Committee Report on the Boeing 737 MAX" (2020) (Case Study)
See what we'd flag in your next strategic memo.
Upload a strategic memo or board deck. Get the same bias audit you just saw for Boeing, on your own high-stakes call, in under 60 seconds.
Or leave your email, we'll run a strategic memo of your choosing and send the readout within a business day.
Ready to audit your own memo right now? Create a free account →