NASA
NASA Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
Estimated impact: $3.2B (shuttle replacement cost); 7 lives
The Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds after launch, killing all seven crew members. Morton Thiokol engineers had warned that O-ring seals in the solid rocket boosters would fail in cold temperatures, but NASA management overrode their objections due to schedule pressure and political considerations.
Decision context
Whether to proceed with the Challenger launch on January 28, 1986, despite engineer warnings that cold temperatures could cause O-ring failure in the solid rocket booster joints.
Biases present in the decision
Toxic combinations
- Yes Committee
- Deadline Panic
Reference class base rates
Across all 146 curated case studies in our library:
Lessons learned
- When engineers raise safety objections and management demands they "prove it is unsafe" rather than "prove it is safe," the burden of proof has been fatally inverted.
- Authority bias caused Thiokol engineers to reverse their no-launch recommendation when pressured by NASA management.
- Availability heuristic led NASA to treat prior successful launches with O-ring erosion as evidence of safety rather than warning signs.
Source: Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission Report, 1986); NASA Report RSC-86-0137 (NTSB Report)
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