Boeing
Boeing 737 MAX MCAS Crashes
Estimated impact: $20B+ in costs; 346 deaths; 20-month grounding
Two Boeing 737 MAX crashes (Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302) killed 346 people. The MCAS flight control system, designed to compensate for engine placement changes, relied on a single angle-of-attack sensor and could override pilot inputs. Boeing did not adequately disclose MCAS to airlines or pilots.
Decision context
Whether to certify the 737 MAX with a single-sensor MCAS system, classify it as a minor change to avoid pilot retraining requirements, and whether to ground the fleet after the first crash.
Biases present in the decision
Toxic combinations
- Blind Sprint
- Yes Committee
- Optimism Trap
- Golden Child
- Deadline Panic
Reference class base rates
Across all 146 curated case studies in our library:
Lessons learned
- Framing MCAS as a minor change avoided simulator training requirements but hid a system that could override pilots
- Loss aversion: Boeing's competitive pressure from Airbus A320neo drove schedule-first decisions that compromised safety margins
- After Lion Air, availability heuristic failure: Boeing and FAA did not ground the fleet because a single crash was not seen as systemic
Source: U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Report (2020); JATR Report (2019); Indonesian KNKT and Ethiopian AIB reports (Post Mortem)
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