Silicon Valley Bank
Silicon Valley Bank Collapse
Estimated impact: $209B
SVB collapsed after a bank run triggered by unrealized losses on its long-duration bond portfolio. Management had concentrated deposits in the tech/VC sector and invested heavily in long-term treasuries and MBS without adequate interest rate hedging, anchoring to the prolonged low-rate environment.
Decision context
Whether to hedge interest rate risk on the held-to-maturity bond portfolio or maintain unhedged positions as rates began rising rapidly in 2022.
Decision anatomy
Red = risk factor present · Green = protective factor present
The analysis below was produced from the pre-decision document only. No hindsight. This is what the platform would have surfaced if it had been running in 2022-01-27.
“SVB's Q4 2021 earnings commentary emphasized the bank's strategy of investing incoming deposits into high-quality long-duration agency MBS and Treasuries with the expectation that its tech/VC deposit base would remain stable. Hedging of interest-rate risk on the held-to-maturity portfolio was explicitly described as unnecessary given the rate outlook. The bank operated without a Chief Risk Officer for eight months in 2022.”
Source: SVB Financial Group Q4 2021 earnings call and 10-K; Federal Reserve SVB Review (April 2023)
Red flags detectable at decision time
- Held-to-maturity book extended to 5.6-year average duration with no interest-rate hedging
- ~90% of deposits uninsured (above FDIC $250K limit), concentrated in a single industry
- No Chief Risk Officer in place from April to December 2022
- 2021 deposit growth of $87B (doubling) was assumed to be durable despite tech-sector cyclicality
- Federal Reserve supervisors had flagged issues but ratings actions lagged
Cognitive biases the platform would have flagged
Hypothetical analysis
DI would flag two compounding decisions: (1) extending HTM duration to 5.6 years during a near-zero-rate environment without hedging was a classic recency-bias mistake — treating a decade of low rates as permanent. (2) The concentrated uninsured deposit base meant a run was a single-industry event away. The vacant CRO seat through most of 2022 is a governance signal that reliably precedes crisis.
Biases present in the decision
★ Primary driver · Severity estimated from bias type and decision outcome
Toxic combinations
Reference class base rates
Across all 143 curated case studies in our library:
Lessons learned
- Anchoring to a decade of near-zero interest rates caused management to treat rising rates as a temporary anomaly rather than a regime change.
- Concentrated depositor bases in a single industry amplify run risk when that industry faces a downturn.
- Recency bias in risk models that rely on recent low-volatility periods systematically underestimate tail risks.
Source: Federal Reserve Board Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of SVB (2023) (Case Study)
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Workflows that fire on decisions like Silicon Valley Bank’s
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