How is sensitive data protected?

All documents are encrypted with AES-256-GCM at rest and TLS 1.2+ in transit. A GDPR anonymization layer removes PII before any AI processing. Hosted on Vercel + Supabase (both SOC 2 Type II); Decision Intel’s own product-level audit is targeted for Q4 2026.

How long does integration take?

Less than 30 minutes. Upload documents directly, connect via OAuth for Slack, or use our REST API for bulk processing.

How does outcome tracking work?

Outcomes are detected automatically from follow-up documents, Slack messages, and web intelligence. You confirm with one click. Each reported outcome makes your future analyses more accurate.

How is Decision Intel different from ChatGPT or a general AI assistant?

ChatGPT gives one opinion from one model: ungoverned, untraceable, unaudited. Decision Intel is the reasoning audit platform. Most tools audit your data; we audit your reasoning — and catch the fatal blind spots in strategic memos before the committee does. It measures the noise in your reasoning the same way Kahneman did in the insurance underwriter study, simulates an AI boardroom of CEO, CFO, and board personas, runs what-if interventions against a 143-case public reference library, and compounds every confirmed outcome back into a calibrated Decision Quality Index your audit committee can defend. Not a chatbot; a reasoning audit, checkable from memo to outcome.

Live demo: Decision Intel on Wirecard (2020)

Top-line result

F18/100

Decision Quality Index · Critical

DAX 30 status (halo), regulator alignment with the company (authority), and active hostility toward critics (confirmation bias as organizational posture) made the decision process structurally incapable of self-correction.

Confirmation BiasAuthority BiasHalo Effect

Uploaded Document

The excerpt the platform analyzed

“2019 annual investor presentation claiming €1.9B held in trustee accounts in the Philippines”

Source:Wirecard AG Investor Relations (Markus Braun, CEO)·2019

Platform-detected signals

4 red flags in the document

Each flag below was detectable from the document text alone. No outcome data. No hindsight.

01

Third-party trustee arrangement obscuring direct verification

Critical · Detectable at decision time

02

Revenue growth outpacing industry by 3x without clear explanation

Critical · Detectable at decision time

03

Short-seller reports from 2015-2019 raising fraud allegations

Critical · Detectable at decision time

04

Auditor reliance on trustee confirmations without independent verification

Critical · Detectable at decision time

Cognitive biases detected

5 biases across the document

★ Confirmation BiasAuthority BiasGroupthinkSelective PerceptionHalo Effect

CEO / Board Question Simulator

Questions the steering committee would ask

Predicted from the document's own signals. In the live product, these are generated from your memo — no two runs produce the same list.

“Is there a chance we're underestimating confirmation bias risk on this decision — and what would change our mind if so?”

“Walk me through third-party trustee arrangement obscuring direct verification — what's our defensible answer if the board raises it?”

“What would it cost us to do baFin investigates the FT allegations on their merits rather than shorting the messengers; EY refuses to sign the 2018 audit without direct bank confirmation… before we commit?”

“If this memo were re-run in six months with the outcome revealed, what do we think would embarrass us most?”

Counterfactual

What a bias-adjusted process would have done

Recommendation

BaFin investigates the FT allegations on their merits rather than shorting the messengers; EY refuses to sign the 2018 audit without direct bank confirmations from BDO Unibank and BPI; supervisory board commissions independent audit in 2019 rather than 2020.

Why it would have worked

Every escalation point — regulator, auditor, board — chose institutional defense over independent verification. A decision process with even one working circuit-breaker would have shortened the fraud window by 18–24 months and prevented the DAX 30 listing.

Estimated alternative outcome

Fraud exposed at ~€500M scale in 2019 rather than €1.9B in 2020. Wirecard delisted but not the systemic failure it became; BaFin retains credibility.

Evidence Timeline

What was visible, and when

Every event below was documentable before the outcome was known. The platform looks for signals like these in live memos.

2015-04
FT Alphaville publishes first "House of Wirecard" posts raising concerns about Asian subsidiaries.
Financial Times, Dan McCrum
2018-09
Wirecard joins the DAX 30, replacing Commerzbank — market cap peaks near €24B.
Deutsche Börse press release
2019-01
FT publishes leaked internal documents alleging accounting fraud at Wirecard Singapore.
FT investigation, Jan 30 2019
2019-02-18
BaFin imposes a two-month ban on short selling Wirecard stock and files criminal complaint against FT journalists for market manipulation.
BaFin official announcement
2019-04
EY issues unqualified 2018 audit opinion despite not obtaining direct confirmation from the Philippine trustee banks.
German Parliamentary Inquiry testimony, 2021
2019-10
Wirecard commissions KPMG special audit in response to FT reporting.
Wirecard ad-hoc disclosure
2020-04-28
KPMG special audit report: could not verify the existence of the €1.9B or the revenue from three key partner businesses.
KPMG Special Investigation Report, April 2020
2020-06-18
BDO confirms from Philippine central bank that the €1.9B never existed in the named accounts.
FT, BSP statement
2020-06-25
Wirecard files for insolvency; Braun arrested.
Munich District Court filings

Who Was in the Room

Stakeholders and positions

Who advocated, who dissented, who was overruled, and who stayed silent — the most reliable single signal of decision-process quality.

Markus Braun

Advocate

CEO (2002–2020)

Arrested June 2020; convicted on fraud and market-manipulation charges in 2024.

Jan Marsalek

Advocate

COO

Fled Germany June 2020; believed to be in Russia.

Alexander von Knoop

Silent

CFO

Thomas Eichelmann

Dissenter

Supervisory Board Chair (from Jan 2020)

Commissioned the KPMG special audit that ultimately exposed the fraud.

Felix Hufeld

Overruled

BaFin President (2015–2021)

Forced to resign January 2021 after acknowledging BaFin "was not effective enough."

Dan McCrum

Dissenter

Financial Times investigative reporter

Subject of BaFin criminal complaint; reporting vindicated by KPMG and BDO findings.

Cross-Case Pattern

Other decisions with the same pattern

Your memo, not Wirecard's

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4 red flags in the document

Each flag below was detectable from the document text alone. No outcome data. No hindsight.

01

Third-party trustee arrangement obscuring direct verification

Critical · Detectable at decision time

02

Revenue growth outpacing industry by 3x without clear explanation

Critical · Detectable at decision time

03

Short-seller reports from 2015-2019 raising fraud allegations

Critical · Detectable at decision time

04

Auditor reliance on trustee confirmations without independent verification

Critical · Detectable at decision time

Questions the steering committee would ask

Predicted from the document's own signals. In the live product, these are generated from your memo — no two runs produce the same list.

“Is there a chance we're underestimating confirmation bias risk on this decision — and what would change our mind if so?”

“Walk me through third-party trustee arrangement obscuring direct verification — what's our defensible answer if the board raises it?”

“If this memo were re-run in six months with the outcome revealed, what do we think would embarrass us most?”

What a bias-adjusted process would have done

Recommendation

Why it would have worked

Estimated alternative outcome

Fraud exposed at ~€500M scale in 2019 rather than €1.9B in 2020. Wirecard delisted but not the systemic failure it became; BaFin retains credibility.

What was visible, and when

Every event below was documentable before the outcome was known. The platform looks for signals like these in live memos.

2015-04

FT Alphaville publishes first "House of Wirecard" posts raising concerns about Asian subsidiaries.

Financial Times, Dan McCrum

2018-09

Wirecard joins the DAX 30, replacing Commerzbank — market cap peaks near €24B.

Deutsche Börse press release

2019-01

FT publishes leaked internal documents alleging accounting fraud at Wirecard Singapore.

FT investigation, Jan 30 2019

2019-02-18

BaFin imposes a two-month ban on short selling Wirecard stock and files criminal complaint against FT journalists for market manipulation.

BaFin official announcement

2019-04

EY issues unqualified 2018 audit opinion despite not obtaining direct confirmation from the Philippine trustee banks.

German Parliamentary Inquiry testimony, 2021

2019-10

Wirecard commissions KPMG special audit in response to FT reporting.

Wirecard ad-hoc disclosure

2020-04-28

KPMG special audit report: could not verify the existence of the €1.9B or the revenue from three key partner businesses.

KPMG Special Investigation Report, April 2020

2020-06-18

BDO confirms from Philippine central bank that the €1.9B never existed in the named accounts.

FT, BSP statement

2020-06-25

Wirecard files for insolvency; Braun arrested.

Munich District Court filings

Stakeholders and positions

Who advocated, who dissented, who was overruled, and who stayed silent — the most reliable single signal of decision-process quality.

Markus Braun

Advocate

CEO (2002–2020)

Arrested June 2020; convicted on fraud and market-manipulation charges in 2024.

Jan Marsalek

Advocate

COO

Fled Germany June 2020; believed to be in Russia.

Alexander von Knoop

Silent

CFO

Thomas Eichelmann

Dissenter

Supervisory Board Chair (from Jan 2020)

Commissioned the KPMG special audit that ultimately exposed the fraud.

Felix Hufeld

Overruled

BaFin President (2015–2021)

Forced to resign January 2021 after acknowledging BaFin "was not effective enough."

Dan McCrum

Dissenter

Financial Times investigative reporter

Subject of BaFin criminal complaint; reporting vindicated by KPMG and BDO findings.